The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire

What we call the Byzantine Empire - although they considered themselves as Romans - lasted in a sense over one thousand years - until the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Even if you count the sack of Constantinople by the western knights of the 4th Crusade in 1204 as the end of the empire as such - after its restoration in 1259, it survived as a small Greek kingdom for its last 200 years - it had still been an empire for nearly 800 years before that. The author of this book sets out to explain this remarkeable longevity.It certainly wasn't because of geography; the author explains that - compared to its western counterpart - the eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire was much more spread out around the Mediterranean, and lacked extensive hinterlands to give it strategic depth against the threat of invaders - of which there were many - from the east and north east. The empire and Constantinople itself was constantly under attack from the Sassanian Persians in the east, and subsequently by their Muslim conquerors; over the centuries - starting with the Huns in the fifth century - wave after wave of warrior peoples from central Asia rode across the steppes north of the Black Sea, entering the Byzantine heartland of the Balkan peninsula and Greece and fetching up against the great land wall of Constantinople.Neither was the empire's resilience due - like the old Roman Empire - to its superior fighting forces. Times had changed; the steppe warriors in particular brought a new dimension to warfare, with their skilled horsemanship, and new technology too in the form of the composite bow with which these accomplished archers could deliver a withering fire from a much greater distance. Combined, these two factors were devastating; when some of the later groups added successful siegecraft to their armory, they represented a real threat to the survival of the empire.The empire survived through a number of ups and downs - the successes of emperor Justinian in the 6th century in recapturing the old western Roman empire territories of Italy and north Africa from the Goths, the stunning loss in the following century of north Africa, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and half of Anatolia to the Muslims armies erupting out of Arabia, the resurgence in the 10th century, the 4th Crusade sack of the 13th , and finally the twilight years of the 14th and 15th centuries. Its survival was due to a number of practices which amounted - although there was no word for it in Greek - to a grand strategy. The author explains - several times - how a good top-down strategy can overcome poor tactics, lack of numerical or physical superiority and even actual battlefield defeats. Whereas, the reverse is not true; the author's example is Hitler who - despite his superior armies, technology and victories, was bound to have lost the war in the end because he had picked the wrong enemies and made the wrong friends.The Byzantines were adept at diplomacy - they were always trying to make deals - even while battle raged. They knew the value of understanding their enemies - exploiting weaknesses and avoiding strengths - to develop enemy-specific strategy. They were adept at pitting one enemy against another, calculating which of the two was the lesser evil. And - if all else failed - they were not in the least bit averse to buying off their enemies. Secondly, they learned from their enemies and adapted accordingly; in particular, the Hun invasion of the 5th century taught them the value of the composite bow in the hands of horseback warriors; the cavalry thus became the main strength of Byzantine armies, replacing the dominance of the infantry in the old Roman empire. Finally, their commanders were instilled with idea that discretion is often the better part of valor; avoid engaging the enemy in big battles - you may lose, even if you have theoretical superiority; even if you win, you can't afford the losses of trained men a big battle always entails; don't chase fleeing enemy - they may just be leading you into an ambush, and if they are really fleeing you don't need to chase them - they've lost. Don't try and totally destroy your enemy - he may make a useful ally against the next one.This is the story, and you certainly emerge from reading this book with a very clear idea of it. The problem is that the author tells it twice. In the first 9 chapters he tells it in a direct sense, as summarised above. He then re-tells it in another 4 chapters - perhaps a third of the whole book - via a description of the various literary sources for Byzantine strategy. While this may qualify the book as more scholarly, I found that it added length but no breadth. Another drawback - an irritant more than a fatal flaw - is the author's constant scholarly "namedropping"; every person, book, ethnic group, place, weapon, military unit or formation referred to is given their name - in contemporary Byzantine Greek, Sassanian Persian, Arabic or Turkic - and then by the name the ancient Greeks would have used, what it was known as in Latin, medieval German or French, and what we would call it today. My favorite sentence: "....the area now known as Bashkiria or Bashkortostan, which may have been the name of the entire nation then (in Romanian slang, bozgori, bozghiori and boangi are still perjoratives for "Hungarians")."There is certainly a lot of history in this book, but it is not a linear account of the history of the Byzantine empire; even within the 9 chapters of the first telling, the narrative jumps backwards and forwards, as the author's intent is to point out the consistencies and similarities in Byzantine strategies at different points in time. Unless you are familiar with the broad outlines of late Roman and Byzantine history, you are likely to find the book unsatisfactory. On the other hand, unless you have the interest that presupposes such familiarity, you are unlikely to have chosen to read this book.

This work offers almost nothing new concerning the Byzantine Empire over classical works on the Eastern Roman Empire, but what is new it that the author uses the Byzantine general strategy since Justinian (or Heraclius) to explain why the Byzantine empire laster more than the normal 250 year lifetime of an empire. Although author Luttwak avoids the traditional analysis that the Empire re-invented itself several times in its history and even used different populations to provide itself with the necessary strength for survival, the author suggests that the general Byzantine strategy is what the U.S. needs to adopt if we are to survive much longer. There is much merit in this analysis, but also grave flaws that need attention. The Byzantines after Justinian found themselves unable to produce a martial population to defend their borders (that featured no natural defenses), and were forced into a foreign policy of alliances, negotiations, redirection of aggression, and outright bribery. Throughout all of this a competent if not numerically strong Byzantine military machine stood ready to die in defense of the empire, thus imparting a definite degree of risk to opponents who might decide on an aggressive strategy. The Byzantines featured a standing professional army to confront national armies of peoples, usually with martial skills limited to only certain modes of warfare, plus the possibility of allies supporting their cause from unexpected quarters. Sometimes these allies were paid by Byzantine gold, sometimes they supported the Byzantines as such action was in their interest for other reasons. The Byzantines could dazzle others with the splendor of Constantinople, clearly the foremost city in the world for a thousand years, and as the seat of the Orthodox Christian religion. The massive debasement of Byzantine coinage did not begin until the reign of Michael IV, the Paphlagonian, in 1034. Once started, the empire never fully recovered economically. The Latins conquered Constantinople in 1204, and the Ottomans in 1453. The United States is facing a massive debasement in the form of devaluation of the dollar as we speak. The importance of a strong economy needs examination. Contrasting the Byzantines with the U.S. is interesting but somewhat speculative. Our money has seen an 80% decline in purchasing power since the start of progressive and socialistic measures first introduced by President Roosevelt. We have avoided runaway inflation to the current time, but the 165 trillion dollars in funded and unfunded debt now looming over us indicates that a devaluation of our currenty is only a matter of time -- and a short time at that (probably a 10:1 or 5:1 devaluation.) American politicians are currently spending as much as possible to feather their own nests and turn their interests into real property before the collapse, something that never happened in the Byzantine Empire. The American people's attention has been re-directed into meaningless sports in the meanwhile, an action and trend stopped dead in its tracks by Justinian when he forbade chariot racing and other professional sports to focus on strengthening the military and his empire. In many respects, the Byzantines were better served by their emperors than the U.S. is by its politicians. The Byzantines survived on trade rather than manufactures, and with the US reaching to point where little is manufactured by American companies in the U.S., the U.S. is also faced on surviving on trade. But what will the U.S. offer in trade? Its land can only go so far. Americans generally believe that innovation will produce the necessary trade items, but the Federal Government is currently moving heaven and earth to stifle private business, entrepreneurship and small business where much of the innovation has historically taken place. Few individuals in the current administration have any experience in for-profit business, and forgotten is the aspect that government produces no wealth. The Byzantines never forgot that axiom. And for security, their formation of the empire into "Themes" with local/provincial military forces (and what would today be called militias) proved eminently successful when backed up by the professional standing army. The U.S. has no such comparable structure. Whereas all Byzantines were expected to help provide for defense, thus making even successful attacks costly for invaders, the U.S. is moving towards gun confiscation and a repeal of the 2nd Amendment. The argument is strong that Americans could learn from the Byzantines, but everything we are currently doing belies that experience and knowledge. As the U.S. loses strength, both in its professional military force and in citizen participation in defense, diplomacy becomes ever more problematic. The Byzantines proved that diplomacy was not a substitute for military force, simply the best approach rather than always resorting to the use of military force. Repeated use of military force bleeds an empire white and eventually brings about its downfall. Since few have heeded the lessons of the Byzantines, empires have normally lasted only as long as the primary cultural and ethnic stock that built the empire remains vigorous. That normally does not last beyond 250 years. In point of reference, the Revolutionary War was 235 years ago. This is an excellent, scholarly book. Highly recommended to everyone interested in the survival of the U.S.

Probably the best book I've read in the last few years. It's a very readable military history that also goes deep into to "war by other means," including diplomacy, prestige, and plain cunning. Byzantine grand strategy was fascinating: they basically pitted enemies against each other to survive even when the odds were completely against them. The entire thing is a triumph of intelligence and civilization over brute force. Only criticism is an obvious modern bias (Islamist are jihadists, western warriors are brave, nevermind that the Arabs were more interested in plunder than conversionnfor much of their early history). Other than that, I can only wish for more books like this out there.

Very informative and thoughrough. However it jumps around a lot and i would suggest a sound chronological understanding of the period is needed to enjoy this book properly. Tom Holland's In the shadow of the sword gives good basic understanding of this period and if followed by Grand strategy would give a thorough understanding of the era and empire. The explanation of the ethno genisis of the different groups which attacked Constantinople over the years was brilliant and the explanation of Byzantine adoption of the mounted archers with compond bows as one of it's key survival strategies is compelling. A good book.

'Byzantine' has become a byword for the complex politics of playing off one enemy against another. This is a well known practice of the Byzantine Empire, but is it right to speak of a 'Grand Strategy'?The first part of Luttwak's book analyses the Eastern Empire's policy regarding the Huns in the middle of the fifth century, and sees here the beginning of a fundamental change in the approach to foreign powers as the Huns were deflected to focus their attentions on the Western Empire.The second part, on Byzantine diplomacy, considers the use of envoys to foreign powers, the roles of religion, imperial prestige and dynastic marriages, and geopolitics. It then describes relations with two particular foreign powers: the Bulgars and Bulgaria, and Muslim Arabs and Turks (thankfully this section avoids the political correctness which has adversely affected many studies of this latter relationship).The third part considers Byzantine warfare, mainly by analysis of various military manuals, concluding with a short chapter on the bold counterstrike of  Heraclius  deep into Persia even as the Persian army with its Avar allies laid siege to Constantinople.Luttwak is clearly a very erudite man and makes every effort to show us that he is. He is not however beyond unacceptably indolent research. In some cases these may be just incorrect dates (reckoning that  Justinian  died in 567 or that Nikephoros II reigned 969-976) or names (spelling 'greaves' as 'grieves'), but see the complete howler where he remarks that  Harald Hardrada  was killed at Stamford Bridge "which is now in Greater London". Picture Luttwak at his laptop, typing into Google and getting Chelsea FC's stadium as the top result.This example also demonstrates another of Luttwak's weaknesses, namely repetition. He twice gives us the same information about Hardrada, although the first time he says (incorrectly) that Hardrada means 'hard ruler', the second time (correctly) that it means 'hard counsel'. Repetition goes to such extremes as mentioning twice, in successive sentences, that the  battle of Manzikert  took place on Friday August 26th 1071.Back to the original question: Is it right to speak of a 'Grand Strategy'? Luttwak really only comes to address this point in the final, short, concluding chapter. He condenses his analysis of the previous 400-odd pages into eight bullet points which he describes as the Byzantine 'Operational Code'. This may not have been a conscious mode of operation as such, but sums up the general practice. Luttwak ultimately offers no new earth-shattering analysis, but this will be a work of value to anyone interested in history, especially military history. HeracliusJustinianHarald Hardradabattle of Manzikert

20 anni dopo "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire", Luttwak ci propone un trattato sull'impero bizantino che questa volta risulta meno schematico ed asciutto. La grande quantità di aneddoti vari, dettagli teologici, analisi molto approfondite degli equipaggiamenti (l'arco composito per esempio), dettagli filologici ed antropologici dei bizantini e dei loro vicini sono tutti messi al servizio di una analisi rigorosa e sistematica della Grande Strategia dell'Impero Bizantino.Un testo veramente di alto livello, a tratti impegnativo che consiglio a chi vuole approfondire ed ampliare le proprie conoscenze sul mondo militare bizantino. Un libro assolutamente da avere.

ottimo

A very important book for the history of the Eastern Roman Empire and the achievements of the Greeks of not so long ago